Presenting Tacit Coordination via Asynchronous Play at 12:15-13:30 in QA406.
On 25th March 2019 we have Yevgeny Tsodikovich of Tel Aviv University visiting us. He is going to give a seminar titled Tacit Coordination via Asynchronous Play at 12:15-13:30 in room A406 in Building Q, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Magyar tudósok körútja 2, 1117 Budapest. Sandwiches will be provided. Please register. Also see our Facebook event.
Abstract: We study infinitely repeated games in which players are limited to subsets of their action space in each stage – a generalization of asynchronous games. We show that such rigidity in the actions facilitates the creation and sustainment of coordination and identify the stage games that are prone to asynchronous behavior. Consequently, publicly announcing prices or the time in which the price is valid, which is considered legal and even encouraged in many countries, can lead to tacit collusion and non-competitive results. Moreover, we indicate which of the players should be the asynchronous ones and identify a wide family of games in which tacit collusion via asynchronous play will arise. We use the worst case rational payoff, the effective minimax, to evaluate the collusive result and compare the outcome of different durations of inactivity.