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- Allocational problems in voting situations (2018-2022); lead by László Á. Kóczy
Fair voting is the cornerstone of democracies. We look at fair allocations on the two sides of voting: how voting rights, that is, representatives are allocated in an indirect voting situation with heterogeneously sized groups of voters and how the resulting voting blocks share power.For the first we study the apportionment methods and compare them using measures of malapportionment. We compare our experience with the rules used in practice using a database of apportionment practices in the European Union and in overseas democracies we collect.After an election, representatives often form voting blocks. We look at a generalised voting model where some players may be absent. We present a theoretical model and consider generalised power indices in such a setting. We also consider a model where some of these blocks refuse to cooperate. Following up on an existing model we present a simpler formulation. We also apply power indices to actual voting situations.
- Networks and externalities in the lab (2013-2018); lead by László Á. Kóczy
In the recent years economics has become an experimental field, where behaviour deduced from the theories can be tested in experimental laboratories. Our aim is to establish an internationally competitive research laboratory in Budapest to test the theories studied in an ongoing research project (HAS LD-004/2010) with the help of students anonymously playing with each other.Our experiments group around 3 themes. We study concepts for partition function form games, where the formation of coalitions produces externalities. Then we look at network games, the structure of cooperation in particular. In matching problems the revelation of true preferences is the first problem. First we test models where agents find it costly to reveal their true preferences, while in another experiment we look at the dynamic development of matching markets, whether stability arises as quickly as predicted by theories.